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NOTES

sion on this subject important. This latest holding may very well
have the effect of increasing the efforts to obtain a more extensive
application of Article 862 to the factual situations that arise.
Perhaps this decision is one of public policy. In view of the
minor position of water transportation in our present economic
system and the wharf facilities that are currently open to the
public along our navigable waters, the need for keeping these
banks clear has diminished greatly. On the other hand, progressing urbanization and the exploration for oil have brought forth
a great demand for this space.
GILLIS W. LONG
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION OF

VESSELs-Appellees were

nonresident corporations engaged in transporting freight in interstate commerce on inland waterways-The Mississippi and Ohio
Rivers. Each maintained an office or agent in Louisiana but had
its principal place of business elsewhere. On trips into Louisiana
a tugboat brought a line of barges to New Orleans, left them for
unloading and reloading, then picked up loaded barges for return
trips to ports outside of Louisiana. These "turn-arounds" were
accomplished as quickly as possible so that the vessels were
within Louisiana for only a short period of time during the year.'
No regular or fixed schedules were maintained in the operation
of the vessels. Louisiana and the City of New Orleans levied ad
valorem taxes on these vessels under assessments based on the
ratio between the total number of miles of appellees' lines in
2
Louisiana and the total number of miles of their entire lines.
The property was not taxed by the states of incorporation. The
circuit court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding
the taxes to be a violation of the commerce and due process
1. The district court found that of the total time covered by the appellees' interstate commerce operation in 1943, the approximate amount spent
by their vessels in Louisiana or in New Orleans was as follows: American
Barge Line's tugboats, 3.8%; Mississippi Valley Barge Line's tugboats,
17.25%; and Mississippi Valley Barge Line's barges, 12.7%. The time so spent
in 1944 was found approximately to be as follows: Mississippi Valley Barge
Line's tugboats, 10.2%; Mississippi Valley Barge Line's barges, 17.5%; Union
Barge Line's tugboats, 2.2%; and Union Barge Line's barges, 4.3%. Ott v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432, 433, n. 1, 93 L.Ed. 431 (U.S.
1949).
2. Under La. Act 170 of 1898, § 29, as amended by La. Act 59 of 1944, §
1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8370].
3. American Barge Line Co. v. Cave, 68 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. La. 1946),
affirmed by Ott v. DeBardeleben Coal Corp., 166 F.(2d) 509 (C.C.A. 5th, 1948),
insofar as the present appellees were concerned. For a discussion of this
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clauses of the Federal Constitution. 3 Certiorari was denied, 4 but
the case was brought up on appeal. Held, reversed, Justice Jackson dissenting. The "apportionment theory" of taxing property
employed in interstate commerce may validly be used in the taxation of vessels engaged in interstate commerce on inland waterways. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Company, 69 S.Ct.
432 (U.S. 1949).
The old Roman principle of mobilia sequuntur personam, or
taxation at the domicile of the owner, 5 has consistently yielded
in modern times to the principle of le situs,6 or taxation in the
jurisdiction where the property has a situs,7 because of the vast
increase in amount and variety of personal property. Although
the concept of "situs" or "actual situs" in modern constitutional
law does not admit of exact definition, the basic element in determining the "situs" of tangible personal property is physical
presence.8 Thus a non-domiciliary state may secure jurisdiction
for taxing tangible personal property only if the property is
physically present within its boundariesf The state of the owner's
domicile may, however, tax personal property which has never
been physically present within the state and is incapable of being
present in the state; 10 but the state of domicile may not tax such
property which has acquired a situs outside that state.11
The "physical presence" required to establish a situs for tangible personal property has not been conclusively defined. Permanent presence of the property within a state is sufficient to
latter case in regard to the DeBardeleben Coal Corporation, see Note (1948)
9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 298.

4. 334 U.S. 858, 859, 69 S.Ct. 1529 (1948).

5. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 20, 11 S.Ct. 876,
878, 35 L.Ed. 613, 616 (1890).
6. Ibid.
7. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 198, 26 S.Ct.
36, 38, 50 L.Ed. 150, 154 (1905).
8. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct. 36,
50 L.Ed. 150 (1905); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 25 S.Ct.
686, 49 L.Ed. 1059, 3 Ann. Cas. 1100 (1905). See also the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Stone In Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 318,
64 S.Ct. 950, 963, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 1299, 153 A.L.R. 245 (1944). For an excellent
discussion of the treatment of the constitutional requirement that property
"in transit" have a "situs" within the taxing state, see Powell, Taxation of
Things in Transit, Part I (1920)

7 Va. L. Rev. 167.

9. American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70, 19 S.Ct. 599,
43 L.Ed. 899 (1899); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149,
20 S.Ct. 631, 44 L.Ed. 708 (1900). Cf. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct. 36, 50 L.Ed. 160 (1905).
10. Southern Pacific Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 32
S.Ct. 13, 56 L.Ed. 96 (1911).
11. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct.
36, 50 L.Ed. 150 (1905).
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establish a situs within that state 12 but mere temporary presence
is not.13 Difficulty arises in determining the jurisdiction of a
state to tax property employed in interstate commerce. In some
such cases, though the same pieces of property are not within the
state continuously, different units of similar property belonging
to the same owner pass in and out of the state throughout the
year. In considering this situation with regard to the taxation of
railroad cars the court has evolved a doctrine of apportionment,
whereby an average amount of the rolling stock of railroads
habitually employed in a non-domiciliary state throughout the
tax period is deemed to have a situs within that state for purposes
5
of taxation. 1 4 In Pullman's PalaceCar Company v. Pennsylvania
the court described the situation it found to establish this situs
in the following terms:
"The cars were continuously and permanently employed in
going to and fro upon certain routes of travel. If they had
never passed beyond the limits of Pennsylvania, it would
not be doubted that the state could tax them, like other property within its borders .... The fact that, instead of stopping
at the state boundary, they cross that boundary in going out
and coming back, cannot affect the power of the state to levy
a tax upon them. The state, having the right, for purposes
of taxation, to tax any personal property found within its
jurisdiction, without regard to the place of the owner's domicile, could tax the specific cars which at a given moment
were within its borders. The route over Which the cars travel
extending beyond the limits of the state, particularcars may
not remain within the state; but the company has at all times
substantially the same number of cars within the state-, and
continuously and constantly uses there a portion of its prop12. Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 25 S.Ct. 686, 49 LEd.
1059, 3 Ann. Cas. 1100 (1905).
13. Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471, 21 L.Ed. 303 (1873); Hays v. Pacific
Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596, 15 L.Ed. 254 (1855).
14. Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 127 U.S. 117, 8 S.Ct. 1037, 32 L.Ed.
94 (1888); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 11 S.Ct.
876, 35 L.Ed.'613 (1890); American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U.S.
70, 19 S.Ct. 599, 43 L.Ed. 899 (1899); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch,
177 U.S. 149, 20 S.Ct. 631, 44 L.Ed. 708 (1900); Germania Refining Co. v. Fuller,
245 U.S. 632, 38 S.Ct. 63, 62 L.Ed. 521 (1917); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright,
249 U.S. 275, 39 S.Ct. 276, 63 L.Ed. 602 (1919); Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma,
290 U.S. 158, 54 S.Ct. 152, 78 L.Ed. 238 (1933); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.

Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 60 S.Ct. 968, 84 L.Ed. 1254 (1940). This average may
be determined by an extrinsic formula which must be reasonable [Union
Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 39 S.Ct. 276, 63 L.Ed. 602, (1919)], but
it need not be mathematically exact [Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning,
310 U.S. 362, 60 S.Ct. 968, 84 L.Ed. 1254 (1940).
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erty; and it is distinctly found, as a matter of fact, that the
company continuously, throughout the periods for which
these taxes were levied, carriedon business in Pennsylvania,
and had about 100 cars within the state."15 (Italics supplied.)
This description of the facts constituting a taxable situs led
to some question as to whether the principle might be applied in
those instances where the instrumentalities sought to be taxed
were within the state for only a fractional part of the year."
Although this question was in part resolved within a decade after
the Pullman's Palace Car case (in American Refrigerator Transit
Company v. Pennsylvania7 and Union Transit Company v.
Lynch'8) by the extension of the doctrine to the taxation of refrigerator cars which were moved about the various states indiscriminately so that those within any particular state were constantly changing, 19 it does not appear that the court has ever
15. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 27, 11 S.Ct.
876, 879, 35 L. Ed. 613, 617 (1890).
16. In the case of New York Central R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 597598, 26 S.Ct. 714, 717, 50 L. Ed. 1155, 1160 (1906), Justice Holmes, in speaking
for the court in distinguishing the facts of the Pullman case from those of
the case at hand, said: ". . . in that case, it was found that the 'cars used in
this State have, during all the time for which the tax is charged, been running into, through, and out of the State.' The same cars were continuously
receiving the protection of the State, and, therefore, it was just that the
State should tax a proportion of them. Whether, if the same amount of protection had been received in respect of constantly changing cars the same
principle would have applied, was not decided, and it is not necessary to decide now. In the present case, however, it does not appear that any specific cars or any average of cars was so continuously in any other State as
to be taxable there. The absences relied on were not in the course of travel
upon fixed routes, but random excursions of casually chosen cars, determined
by varying orders of particular shippers and the arbitrary convenience of
other roads."
The latest expression of this idea is to be found in Northwest Airlines
v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 297, 64 S.Ct. 950, 953, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 1287, 153 A.L.R.
245, 248 (1944), wherein Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the court in upholding a full-value tax upon aircraft by the state of the owner's domicile,
said: ". . . the doctrine of apportionment has neither in theory nor in practice been applied to tax units of interstate commerce visiting for fractional
periods of the taxing year. (Thus, for instance, 'The coaches of the company
. * . are daily passing from one end of the state to the other,' in Pullman's
Palace Car Company v. Pennsylvania.... ) The continuous protection by a
state other than the domiciliary State-that is, protection throughout the
tax year-has furnished the constitutional basis for tax apportionment in
these interstate commerce situations, and it is on that basis that the tax
laws have been formed and administered." For a criticism that Justice
Frankfurter may have been overstating the principles and facts of the railroad cases, see note by Powell, State Taxation of Airplanes-Herein also of
Ships and Sealing Wax and Railroad Cars (1944) 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1097, 11001101.
17. 174 U.S. 70, 19 S.Ct. 599, 43 L.Ed. 899 (1899).
18. 177 U.S. 149, 20 S.Ct. 631, 44 L.Ed. 708 (1899).
19. The doctrine was also extended under similar facts to cover the taxation of tank cars in Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 39 S.Ct.
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passed upon a case where the facts concerned "multistate inter'20
mittent vehicular migrants.
In the taxation of vessels, the court, prior to the case under
discussion, had followed the rule that vessels were taxable only
at the domicile of the owner, save where they had acquired an
"actual situs" elsewhere and they did this when they operated
wholly on the waters within another state.2 1 In no case concerning vessels, however, was there involved an apportioned tax, "2
and in no such case had the court said that a situs might be acpresence
quired in a non-domiciliary state only by continuous
23
within that state throughout the taxing period.
Therefore, in extending the doctrine of apportionment to
taxation of vessels engaged in interstate commerce on inland
waters, the court has acted consistently with the general principles it has recognized for constitutional taxation of tangible
movables. As to the class of transportation involved, it would be
difficult to make a valid logical and practical distinction between
carriers which pass back and forth through the states on regular
routes on inland waters, often on fixed schedules, and those which
pass back and forth on steel rails. The court was specific in confining its findings to transportation on inland waters;24 and, in
view of the established principles of law, it appears likely that
ocean carriage will continue to be taxable only at the domicile of
25
its owner.
276, 63 L.Ed. 602 (1919), although the formula used was held to be unconstitutional.
20. See Powell, supra note 16. To this extent at least it seems that Justice Frankfurter's statement (quoted in note 16, supra) must be conceded
to be accurate.
21. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432, 434 (U.S. 1949).
The following cases concerned vessels: Hays v. Pacific Mall S.S. Co., 58
U.S. 596, 15 L.Ed. 254 (1855); Saint Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 78 U.S. 423,
20 L.Ed. 192 (1871); Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. 471, 21 L.Ed. 303 (1873);
Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 25 S.Ct. 686, 49 L.Ed. 1059,
3 Ann. Cas. 1100 (1905); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 209, 26
S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed. 1082 (1906); Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S.
63, 32 S.Ct. 13, 56 LEd. 96 (1911). For a discussion of these cases see Ambler,
Personal Property Taxes on Vessels Regularly Engaged in Interstate and
Foreign Commerce (1945) 20 Wash. L. Rev. 1, and Powell, Taxation of
Things in Transit (1921) 7 Va. L. Rev. 167, 245, 429, 495.
22. Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432, 434 (U.S. 1949); Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law (1939) 645.
23. See note 21, supra.
24. Ott v. Mississippi Barge Line Co., 69 S.Ct: 432, 434 (1949). It is interesting to note that here for the first time the court divided its discussion
of the cases concerning vessels on the basis of whether inland or ocean
carriage was concerned.
25. The policy involved is "that if they were not taxable at the domicile
they might not be taxable at all" as they do not remain in any port for a
sufficient length of time to acquire a taxable situs. See note 21, supra.
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This case seems to indicate also that the court has extended
the doctrine of apportionment to instrumentalities of interstate
commerce which visit a state sporadically and for only fractional periods of the year. 26 Perhaps the only guides in the future
application and possible extension of the doctrine are (1) under
the commerce clause, what portion of an interstate organization
" 'may appropriately be attributed to each of the various states
in which it functions,' ",27 and (2) under the due process clause,
" 'whether the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the tax-

ing state.'

",28

JOHN

A.

RICHIE

DIVORCE AND SEPARATION-INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE JURISDICTIONAL BASEs-DoMIcnLE OF WIFE-Husband and wife were

married in 1930, established their matrimonial domicile in Ascension Parish, and lived together in that parish until 1947. In July,
1947, the wife left her husband and moved to the home of her sister in Orleans Parish. In April, 1948, she filed a suit for separation
from bed and board in the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, alleging cruelty. Citation issued, and the husband was
served at his domicile in Ascension Parish. Exceptions to the
jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae of the Orleans
District Court were sustained. Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, alleging that her husband's cruelty had privileged her to
establish a separate domicile in Orleans Parish; that she had
taken with her to that parish the marital res (marital relationship); and therefore that the Orleans Parish Court acquired jurisdiction over the marital status, regardless of the domicile of the
26. "It is said in this case that the visits of the vessels to Louisiana were

sporadic and for fractional periods of the year only and that there was no
average number of vessels in the state every day. The District Court indeed
said that there was no showing that the particular portion of the property
sought to be taxed was regularly and habitually used and employed in Louisiana for the whole of the taxable year." Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge
Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432,- 435 (U.S. 1949). See note 1, supra. The court would
not resolve this question (or these contentions) on the ground that the appellees had not exhausted their state administrative and judicial remedies.

See also headnotes 1 and 3, p. 432.
27. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 69 S.Ct. 432, 434 (U.S. 1949).

28. Ibid. In view of (1) the conclusion of the court under the facts involved, (2) the -broad language of the court (e.g., at p. 435, "We can see no
reason which should put water transportation on a different constitutional
footing than any other interstate enterprises."), and (3) the concurrence if
eight members of the court in contrast to the four diverse opinions of the
Northwest case, It seems likely that the doctrine of apportionment will be extended also to the taxation of the remaining important instrumentality of
interstate commerce-aircraft.

